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NOTE
EXECUTION OF THE INSANE CRIMINAL:
FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
HE Florida criminal justice system convicted Alvin Bernard Ford in
1975 of murdering a policeman and sentenced him to death.' A fed-
eral court upheld both his conviction and sentence. 2 During the trial
Ford showed no indication that he might be incompetent to stand trial. In
early 1982, however, Ford began to suffer behavioral changes, which became
increasingly noticeable as time passed.3 When Ford's behavior became seri-
ous, his counsel sought a psychiatrist's help. After fourteen months of psy-
chiatric evaluation, the psychiatrist concluded that Ford suffered from a
serious mental disease that could affect his ability to assist in the defense of
his life. 4 Ford's counsel sought the services of another psychiatrist after
Ford refused to see the original psychiatrist again. The second psychiatrist
concluded that Ford had no comprehension of why he was to be executed;
indeed, Ford believed he was incapable of being executed because of his abil-
ity to control the mind of the Governor of Florida. Within a month after the
second psychiatrist's examination, Ford had become completely incom-
prehensible. 5
Based upon the competency of his client and the two psychiatric reports,
1. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 503 (Fla. 1979). The trial court issued the death penalty
pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985).
2. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 820 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
3. Ford began experiencing a variety of delusions. One of these delusions caused an
obsession with the Ku Klux Klan. Ford believed that a conspiracy, created solely to pursue
his death, existed between the Ku Klux Klan and the prison guards. Ford believed that the
prison guards had taken 135 of his friends and family hostage within the prison. In 1983 Ford
sent a letter to the Attorney General of Florida claiming that he had taken control of the
prison and ended the crisis. Additionally, Ford began to refer to himself as Pope John Paul
III.
4. The Supreme Court cited testimony in which the psychiatrist described Ford's condi-
tion as "a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which closely resembles 'Paranoid Schizo-
phrenia With Suicide Potential.'" Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2598, 91 L. Ed. 2d
335, 342 (1986). Paranoid schizophrenia is a specific type of schizophrenia characterized "by
the presence of delusions of persecution or grandeur." 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1168 (H. Kaplan 3d ed. 1980). A person who is diagnosed with paranoid schizo-
phrenia typically is hostile and aggressive. Id. A paranoid schizophrenic may resort to an act
of violence in an attempt to strike out at his imaginary persecutors. W. NEUSTATTER, PSY-
CHOLOGICAL DISORDER AND CRIME 58-59 (1953).
5. Ford began speaking in a code in which he followed each word with the word "one."
This code caused him to speak in incomprehensible phrases such as "God one. Father one.
Pope one." 106 S. Ct. at 2599, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 342.
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Ford's counsel invoked section 922.07 of the Florida statutes.6 The statute
provides that a three-member commission of psychiatrists examine Ford to
determine whether he comprehended the death penalty and whether he un-
derstood his death sentence.7 Although the three doctors disagreed regard-
ing Ford's exact mental state, they did agree that Ford was sane as defined
under the Florida state statute. Following the examination, the Florida
Governor signed a death warrant for Ford's execution.
Ford's counsel attempted to stay the execution and sought a new compe-
tency hearing in the Florida court system, but the Florida Supreme Court
denied the stay.8 In response to the state's inaction, Ford then filed a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal court for the Southern District of Florida. The
district court denied the petition without a hearing. 9 On appeal, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed Ford's execution. 10 The State of Flor-
ida appealed the stay of the execution to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court denied Florida's application to vacate the stay.1 The
court of appeals then confronted the merits of the case. In a per curiam
opinion the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Ford
should be denied a stay of his execution.' 2 Ford appealed the court's hold-
ing, and the United States Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari to
confront the issue of whether the execution of an insane criminal is cruel and
unusual punishment under the eighth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.' 3 The Court also examined whether section 922.07 of the Florida
statutes provides sufficient due process in determining the competency of a
criminal. Held, reversed: The eighth amendment prohibits a state from in-
flicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane; furthermore, section
922.07 of the Florida statutes fails to provide adequate assurances of accu-
racy to satisfy the necessary due process requirements set out in earlier
Supreme Court decisions. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d
335 (1986).
6. The statute provides in part: "When the Governor is informed that a person under
the sentence of death may be insane, he shall stay execution of the sentence and appoint a
commission of three psychiatrists to examine the convicted person." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 922.07(1) (West 1985).
7. The critical question asks whether the prisoner "understands the nature and effect of
the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him." Id.
8. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So. 2d 471, 475 (Fla. 1984). The Florida Supreme Court
stated that the statute provides the final decision on a person's competency. Id. The Governor
makes the final decision over a criminal's competency, and the court cannot review his deci-
sion. Id.; Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1984).
9. Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538, 539 (11th Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 543.
11. Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
12. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 528 (11th Cir. 1985). The court relied upon
Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1984), and Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9,
13-14 (1950). More importantly, the court recognized that if it had interpreted the two afore-
mentioned cases incorrectly, then the Supreme Court would have to reexamine the cases' true
meaning. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d at 528.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF EXECUTING THE INSANE
PRISONER UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. The Eighth Amendment Issue
The Supreme Court has directly confronted the issue of the execution of
the insane on five previous occasions. 14 The most notable case is Solesbee v.
Balkcom,' 5 in which the Supreme Court upheld the Governor's discretion-
ary power in determining the competency of a prisoner to be executed. 16 In
Ford the Supreme Court went further in its analysis of Solesbee and distin-
guished it from the case at bar. 17 The Court cited the eighth amendment as
the differentiating factor.' 8 The only fourteenth amendment' 9 issue that the
Solesbee Court addressed was that of due process; the Supreme Court did
not actually confront the issue of cruel and unusual punishment in light of
the fourteenth amendment 20 because the Court did not recognize until 1962
that it must incorporate the eighth amendment 2' into the analysis of the due
process issues provided under the fourteenth amendment. 22
This new form of analysis led the Supreme Court to reconsider some pre-
14. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 550-51 (1958) (Harlan, J., concurring) (specifi-
cally citing to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S.
561, 569-70 (1953) (refusing to hold plenary hearing on sanity based upon due process); Soles-
bee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1950) (Georgia statute does not offend due process by
allowing Governor to decide criminals' competency for execution); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S.
431, 440 (1948) (failing to reach constitutional issues because state remedy exists); Nobles v.
Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897) (referring to ancient treatises on issue of right to jury trial
after conviction and before execution). The Court indirectly addressed the issue of sanity
before execution in three other cases. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 807-08 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J.) (denying stay of execution after deliberating the competency to waive challenge
to execution); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1306-07 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice)
(granting stay of execution pending further inquiry); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (addressing issue of competency and ability to waive rights to
delay execution).
15. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
16. Id. at 13-14. The Court went on to note that courts historically have held that a
Governor's decision is nonreviewable. Id. at 13. In Solesbee v. Balkcom the Court cited
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897), for the proposition that if judicial review were
automatic, the review could then prohibit the states from carrying out a death sentence. Soles-
bee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. at 12. Since a prisoner could claim at any time up to the precise
moment of execution that he was insane, the appeals for a sanity determination could be end-
less. Theoretically, a prisoner could postpone his execution forever. See Hazard & Louisell,
Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 399-400 (1962);
Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 765, 789-90 (1980). Solesbee might, therefore, lead to a logical conclusion that would
prevent the Supreme Court from staying Ford's execution.
17. 106 S. Ct. at 2600, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 343-44.
18. Id., 91 L. Ed. 2d at 344.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20. 106 S. Ct. at 2600, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 344; Note, supra note 16, at 765-66.
21. The men initially implementing the United States Constitution drafted the Bill of
Rights to protect individual liberties from federal government intrusion and not to limit states'
governments. R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 4
(1981). Through interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court on several
occasions has used the due process clause of that amendment as the vehicle for incorporating
these governmental limitations and thereby prevented state governments from infringing cer-
tain individual rights. Id. at 301.
22. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
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vious holdings.23 Thus, Justice Powell correctly indicated in Wainwright v.
Ford24 that the Supreme Court had "never determined whether the Consti-
tution prohibits execution of a criminal defendant who is currently in-
sane." 25 Ford v. Wainwright, therefore, constituted a case of first impression,
at least under the scrutiny of the eighth amendment.
B. The Objective and Subjective Tests of the Eighth Amendment
The Objective Test: Historical Explanations. The eighth amendment pro-
vides in part that government shall not inflict "cruel and unusual punish-
ments."' 26 The framers of the Bill of Rights took this language verbatim
from the English Bill of Rights.27 More importantly, the framers also car-
ried across the sea the intent behind the language, which they incorporated
into the eighth amendment. 28 Based upon the language and the intent,
American courts have established an objective test in determining whether
the specific punishment in question was considered cruel and unusual in
1789, the year in which the Bill of Rights was adopted.29
The United States Supreme Court took this basic premise and applied it in
determining whether, in 1789, the execution of the insane was considered
cruel and unusual punishment. 30 The historical conclusion seemed unani-
mous, although the rationale behind the conclusion that such executions
were cruel and unusual was far from uniform. 31 Researchers have univer-
23. The Court has on several occasions reexamined its fourteenth amendment decisions in
light of the incorporation of the eighth amendment. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-99
(1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 355-58 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195
n.47 (1976). In Gregg the Court explicitly discussed how the holding in McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 185-86 (1971), was redefined under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239
(1972) (per curiam), by applying the eighth amendment in correlation with the fourteenth
amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47.
24. 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
25. Id. at 1220.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983). George Mason had earlier au-
thored the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776, which became a basis for the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution, by adopting verbatim the language of the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights. Id.
28. See A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM IN AMERICA 205-07 (1968). George Mason took the tenth section of the English
Bill of Rights and transformed it word for word into his own writings. Id. at 207. The spirit
and liberties that prevailed in the Magna Carta were subsequently transformed into Mason's
Declaration, and this spirit exists in today's eighth amendment. Id. at 205-07.
29. Under the objective test, if the punishment in question was considered cruel and unu-
sual in 1789, then the punishment would still be considered a violation of the eighth amend-
ment. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 471-73 (7th ed.
1903). Justice Brennan recognized this test in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972).
30. 106 S. Ct. at 2600-01, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 344-45.
31. Legal historians have identified five major rationales for the common law rule. First,
Blackstone asserted that the criminal's madness acted as sufficient punishment in itself. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 388-89 (Oxford 1769) ("furiosus
solo furore punitur" means "madness is punishment in itself"); I N. WALKER, CRIME AND
INSANITY IN ENGLAND 197 (1968). Coke enunciated the second theory when he explained
that killing a madman served no deterring value for the rest of society because executing the
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sally concluded that throughout history society has considered the execution
of the insane to be cruel and unusual.3 2 The common law characterized the
act as "savage" 33 and "inhuman. '3 4 This characterization dates back to
early English history, 35 when the execution was mandatorily stayed if the
criminal was found to be insane.36
Regardless of the reasoning behind the historical rule that society should
not execute insane criminals, historians agree that such executions constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.3 7 Prior to 1789, society had uniformly for-
mulated and adopted a common standard of decency that prohibited the
execution of the insane.38 The Court concluded that under the objective
test, execution of insane criminals constituted cruel and unusual punishment
prior to the critical date of 1789.39
The Subjective Test. The Evolving Standards of Decency. The United States
Supreme Court expressly recognizes that courts must interpret the eighth
amendment in a "flexible and dynamic manner." 4 The Court bases this
recognition upon the understanding that society's standards are not static,
but evolve and mature.41 Thus, the Court redefines the cruel and unusual
insane so repulsed society that few would learn and be deterred. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE
6 (1644). But see Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 385 (criticising Coke's argument).
Hawles ascribed to a third theory founded upon a mixture of superstition and Christianity.
Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, in 11 STATE TRIALS 473, 477 (T.
Howell ed. 1816). People believed that the gods would punish the executioner of a madman;
more importantly, Christians believed that a mentally incompetent person could not make
peace with his maker nor prepare for death. Id.; see also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 18
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Hawles's theory); N. HURNARD, THE KING'S
PARDON FOR HOMICIDE: BEFORE A.D. 1307, at 159 (1969) (concerned with both executioner
and incompetent); 1 N. WALKER, supra, at 197 (Christian charity requires that person be sane
before he is executed); Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 387 (discussing writing of St.
Thomas Aquinas). Bracton posed a fourth rationale on the simple explanation that the incom-
petent person lacked sufficient reason to comprehend his fate. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (S. Thorne trans. 1968). Hale posed the final justification by
asserting that a madman could not defend himself. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 34-35 (The Savoy 1736). Hale contended that until the precise moment of
execution the criminal had the opportunity to stay his judgment by providing any information
that might prove his innocence. Id.
32. Note, supra note 16, at 778. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Solesbee
v. Balkcom highlighted the historical perspective of execution of the criminally insane. Soles-
bee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. at 17-19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). A variety of historians and
lawyers have reached the same conclusion. N. HURNARD, supra note 31, at 159; 1 N.
WALKER, supra note 31, at 197 (discussing the five historical theories); Hazard & Louisell,
supra note 16, at 383 (discussing numerous theories).
33. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at 24-25.
34. Id.; E. COKE, supra note 31, at 6 (characterizing the execution of insane criminals as
both cruel and inhumane).
35. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at 25; 1 M. HALE, supra note 31, at 35.
36. 1 N. WALKER, supra note 31, at 196.
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. 106 S. Ct. at 2606, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351.
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (plurality opinion) (eighth amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment must be interpreted with reference to modern
standards); see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (interpretation must evolve
with public opinion).
41. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 172-73.
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punishment clause of the eighth amendment as public attitudes evolve. 42
These attitudes serve as an aid in the Court's interpretation of the eighth
amendment.
II. FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
A. The Conclusion Under the Eighth Amendment Analysis
In applying the objective test in Ford, the Court came to the conclusion
that executing Ford constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 43 Since soci-
ety historically had prohibited the execution of the mentally incompetent
prior to 1789,44 the objective test characterized such punishment as cruel
and unusual in modern society.
In applying the subjective test, the Court came to the same conclusion
that executing Ford resulted in cruel and unusual punishment in light of
society's evolving standards.45 In applying the evolving standards of society,
the Court noted as evidence of the public attitude against the execution of
the criminally insane that not one state in the Union permitted the execution
of the insane.46 In support of this assertion the Court observed that of the
forty-one states that utilize the death penalty, 47 twenty-six states by statute
expressly prohibit the execution of the insane, 48 four states have done so by
judicial decision, 49 seven states have discretionary rules, 50 and the remaining
42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173. Public attitudes, such as attitudes of legislatures
and juries, must be consulted in eighth amendment cases. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977).
43. 106 S. Ct. at 2602, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
44. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
45. 106 S. Ct. at 2601-02, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
46. Id.
47. The forty-one states that have adopted the death penalty are: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, In-
diana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. The nine states
that have not adopted the death penalty are: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, North Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
48. ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-4024(B) (1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3704 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-18-112(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1985); FLA. STAT ANN. § 922.07(1)
(West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2603 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-2-3 (Smith-
Hurd 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006(3) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.240(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75(c) (Supp. 1986); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(a) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(2) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 176.455(1) (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
14-7 (1984); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 656 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1001(a) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.29 (Anderson 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1008 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-24 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-19-13(1) (1982); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-902 (Supp. 1986).
49. State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (1943); Commonwealth v. Moon, 383
Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96, 99 (1955); Jordon v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327, 328-29 (1911);
State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 108 P.2d 641, 651 (1940).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-2 (Burns 1981);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 62 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-3(7)
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four are silent on the issue. 5' The Court relied upon these figures as strong
support of the prevailing public attitude opposing the execution of the insane
criminal. 52 The Court also relied upon some historic theories that they be-
lieved applied as well today as they did in 1789. 53
The application under both the objective test and subjective test led the
Court to the same conclusion. The Supreme Court thus held that the state
cannot, consistent with the eighth amendment, carry out the death penalty
against an insane convict. 54
B. The Sufficiency of the Florida Statute in Providing
an Evidentiary Proceeding
The Writ of Habeas Corpus Proceeding. Having concluded that the eighth
amendment prohibits execution of an insane prisoner, the Court confronted
its next hurdle. Since under the Florida statute55 the court already had
judged Ford to be mentally competent for execution, the Supreme Court had
to determine whether it had the power to review the sanity proceeding.
Ford's counsel petitioned the Supreme Court, by a writ of habeas corpus, to
review Florida's evidentiary process. Ford's counsel argued that Florida's
process failed to provide adequate assurances of reliable fact-finding and
thereby violated the Constitution.5 6
The Supreme Court relied heavily upon Townsend v. Sain 57 in its determi-
nation. In Townsend the Supreme Court held that, in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, "a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier
of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts."'58 In addi-
tion, if a state court has held a full hearing and found the relevant facts, then
the court's findings are presumed correct. 59 In such a case no evidentiary
hearing is required. 60 Taking these constitutional premises, the Court con-
cluded that Ford deserved a federal hearing because no Florida court had
been involved in the initial competency hearing. 6' The only ruling by a
(1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
46.01 (Vernon 1979); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-177 (1983).
51. The four states that stand either silent or undetermined on the execution of the men-
tally incompetent are Idaho, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont.
52. 106 S. Ct. at 2601-02, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
53. Id. The Court recognized that killing an insane criminal allowed for no retributional
value because the mentally incompetent could not comprehend what was occurring. Id. The
Court also emphasized the need to allow a criminal sufficient time to come to peace with his
conscience and deity. Id. The Court noted that the idea of executing a mentally incompetent
person offends humanity. Id. Historians used the same theories to explain the common law
rule. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
54. 106 S. Ct. at 2602, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985).
56. Ford's counsel petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus on the assertion that
the evidentiary hearing provided an insufficient adjudication of Ford's competency by failing
to give him a chance to cross-examine and actively participate in the process.
57. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
58. Id. at 312-13.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
60. 106 S. Ct. at 2602, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 347.
61. Id. at 2602-03, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 374.
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Florida court occurred in Ford v. Wainwright,62 in which the Florida
Supreme Court stated that a judical determination was not in order because
the Florida statutory procedure sufficiently determined competency and that
the court could not review the Governor's decision.63 Since there was no
prior judicial review, the Supreme Court held that it had authority to review
Ford's case. 64
The Court went on to hold that even if a state court had heard the evi-
dence of Ford's competency, the federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing if any of the six occurrences described in Townsend v. Sain were
missing.65 The Court recognized that the importance of the hearing in ques-
tion bears a direct relationship to the adequacy of the state court proce-
dure. 66 At the minimum the criminal must have "an opportunity to be
allowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected."' 67 Armed with these
minimum due process requirements, the Supreme Court confronted the spe-
cific Florida statute in question and the fact-finding process.
The Evidentiary Process Provided Under Florida Law. Section 922.07 of the
Florida statutes provides the guidelines for the proceedings to determine the
competency of the criminal to be executed. 68 Although the statute provides
for the attorney to be present, the role of the attorney is nonadversarial in
nature.69 The court pointed to this lack of involvement of the attorney, in
both asserting the rights of his client and challenging the opinions of the
62. 451 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1984).
63. Id. at 475 (decision based upon court's previous holding in Goode v. Wainwright, 448
So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1984)).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 2602-03, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 347.
65. Id. The federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing if:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed
at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of
fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 313.
66. 106 S. Ct. at 2603, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 347-48. The Court has recognized the obvious
gravity in the determination of the death penalty because of the punishment's finality. Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (qualitative difference
exists between imprisonment and execution); see also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 23-24
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (decision on whether to execute is at best a truly informed
guess that requires due process).
67. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985). The guidelines are as follows: after being
informed of the criminal's potential insanity, the Governor of the State of Florida must pro-
vide a commission of three psychiatrists to examine the criminal; the three psychiatrists ex-
amine the criminal in the presence of each other; the commission reports its findings to the
Governor; the Governor then gains the responsibility of determining whether the convicted
person is mentally capable of comprehending the death penalty and why it is being imposed on
him; the Governor must issue a death warrant if the Governor decides the prisoner meets the
competency test; if, however, the prisoner does not meet the competency test, then the Gover-
nor is to commit the convict to a mental hospital until such time as his sanity is restored; both
the counsel for the convict and the state attorney may be present during the examination. Id.
69. See Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. 1984) (Governor's policy).
[Vol. 41
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psychiatrists, as a deficiency in Florida's statute. 70
The Court further criticized the Florida statute for its procedure that
failed to involve the prisoner in the truth-seeking process. 71 The cornerstone
of due process is the chance to be heard.72 The Florida statute prevented the
prisoner from asserting his full rights by keeping him from submitting evi-
dence to help pursue the truth-seeking process in the determination of his
sanity. 73 The Supreme Court has previously held that courts should admit
all relevant information that would shed light on the factual scenario. 74 The
fact that admission of evidence might cause a delay in the fact-finding pro-
cess is of little concern when such a crucial decision as life or death is in-
volved. 75 The Court noted that the need for all relevant information is
compounded when the state's experts disagree on the mental competency of
the prisoner. 76
The Court emphasized that the most alarming deficiency in the Florida
statute was the fact that the sole decision was vested in the executive
branch.77 The Governor of Florida not only initiated the evidentiary pro-
cess by setting up a commission, but he was also responsible for the ultimate
decision on the prisoner's sanity. The true conflict lay in the fact that the
Governor was also in charge of the state's prosecutors. The potential parti-
ality of the Governor was more than evident. The Court was greatly con-
cerned about the nonreviewable discretion that the Florida courts entrusted
to the Governor. 78
After close scrutiny of the Florida scheme, the Court concluded that the
procedures were inadequate. 79 The Court held that section 922.07 provided
insufficient assurances of accuracy in the determination of a criminal's sanity
70. 106 S. Ct. at 2604, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 348-49. "For two centuries, common law judges
and lawyers have regarded the opportunity of cross-examination as an essential safeguard of
the accuracy and completeness of testimony, and they have insisted that the opportunity is a
right and not a mere privilege." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 19 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); see
also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (highlights importance of cross-
examination). This right is particularly important in competency hearings because psychia-
trists frequently disagree. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 64-65
(1985).
71. 106 S. Ct. at 2604, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 349.
72. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
73. 106 S. Ct. at 2604, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 349. Ford's counsel on several occasions attempted
to submit the psychiatric findings of both psychiatrists, but he was refused.
74. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (joint opinion) (states can rarely limit evidence regarding the mitiga-
tion of a sentence).
75. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977); see Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. at 25
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
76. 106 S. Ct. at 2604-05, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 349. The three-member psychiatric commission
came to three different conclusions on Ford's mental diagnosis. All three, however, came to
the same conclusion on his sanity as defined under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985).
This discrepancy requires both time and all relevant information for a proper adjudication on
the issue of the competency of the prisoner. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1096, 84
L. Ed. 2d 53, 64-65 (1985).
77. 106 S, Ct. at 2605, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 350.
78. Id.; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
79. 106 S. Ct. at 2605, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351.
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to meet the due process requirements set out in Townsend v. Sain.80 The
Court then granted an evidentiary hearing, de novo, in federal district court
on the issue of Ford's competency to be executed.8 '
The Guidelines for a State's Evidentiary Process. After invalidating the Flor-
ida statute, the Court attempted to outline some criteria for a constitution-
ally sound scheme. 82 The Court preceded its dictum by stating that it did
not require a complete trial on the sanity issue, but left specific and appropri-
ate enforcement measures to the state.8 3 With that warning, the Court es-
tablished some guidelines. 8 4 The Court noted that the main thrust of the
proceeding should be to promote accuracy in the fact-finding hearing.85 The
scheme should thus allow an uninhibited flow of all relevant information for
consideration.8 6 The process for choosing the experts must be neutral and
provide for sound judgments.8 7
C. Opinions by the Remaining Justices
Justice Powell: Definition of Insanity. Justice Powell concurred in the judg-
ment, but only in part with the opinion. Justice Powell asserted that the
majority left unanswered the definition of insanity in the context of the exe-
cution of a criminal.88 The Florida statute based its definition of insanity
upon a showing that the prisoner understood what the death penalty was
and why the state was inflicting it upon him. 89 Justice Powell claimed that
the definition of insanity must, at a minimum, trigger the constitutional pro-
tection of the eighth amendment. 90 The eighth amendment should protect
people from execution if they are "unaware of the punishment they are
about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."91 Justice Powell left open the
possibility for the states to broaden the definition of insanity that would
lower the threshold required to establish insanity. 92 This approach would
extend the eighth amendment protection to a wider range of criminals.
Justice Powell expressed his view that the Constitution does not require a
full-scale sanity trial for minimum due process.93 He based his conclusion
upon three major assertions. First, the issue in a sanity trial is not whether a
prisoner is to be executed, but when. 94 Justice Powell thus disagreed with
80. Id. at 2605-06, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351; see supra note 65.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2606, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351.
83. Id. at 2605-06, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351.




88. Id. at 2606-07, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 352.
89. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(1) (West 1985).
90. 106 S. Ct. at 2608, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 354.
91. Id. at 2609, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 354.
92. Id. at 2608 n.3, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 354 n.3.
93. Id. at 2610, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 356.
94. Id.
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the majority as to the importance of the evidentiary hearings. 95 This ap-
proach led him to disagree further with the majority's view that increased
procedural requirements were necessary. 96 Second, Justice Powell asserted
that a presumption should stand against the prisoner's claim of insanity be-
cause the claimant had already been subjected to a sanity test and been de-
termined competent to stand trial. 97 This high threshold would prevent the
repetitious and nonmeritorious claims to which the majority alluded in its
opinion.98 Finally, a hearing on a criminal's sanity requires subjective judg-
ment and not specific issues such as those commonly asserted in a normal
trial or hearing. 99 Justice Powell argued that the objective findings of a
court may provide little aid in the subjective process of determining san-
ity. 100 In light of these three assertions, Justice Powell returned to his initial
conclusion that the Constitution does not require a full evidentiary trial to
determine sanity before execution.101
Justices O'Connor and White: Protection of the Insane a State-Initiated
Right. Justice O'Connor concurred in part in the result and dissented in
part. Justice White joined in her opinion. At the outset, the two Justices did
not believe that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of the insane
as an independent substantive right. ' 0 2 They recognized, however, that the
laws of the individual states might trigger the requirements of due pro-
cess. 0 3 Both Justices contended that Florida's statute provided an exercisa-
ble right to due process. 10 4 The mandatory language that the state "shall
have [insane prisoners] committed to the state hospital for the insane"' 0 5
invoked the protection provided under the fourteenth amendment. 0 6 They
believed that the right to keep the insane from being executed was not an
independent right, but a state-protected right that arises upon the state's
own initiative in the statutory language that expressly prevents the execution
of the insane. 107 This fourteenth amendment protection extends only as far
as the situation requires. Although due process may be of great importance
to the prisoner, the fact that he has been convicted dramatically reduces the
extent of protection provided under the fourteenth amendment.108
Justice O'Connor's opinion indicated that a state-created right existed
95. Id.
96. Id.; see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
97. 106 S. Ct. at 2610, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 356-57.
98. Id. at 2606, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351.
99. Id. at 2610-11, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 357; see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30
(1979) (determination of sanity is not merely factual; it requires expert diagnosis such as psy-
chiatric or psychological examinations).
100. 106 S. Ct. at 2611, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 357; see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430
(1979).
101. 106 S. Ct. at 2611, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 357.
102. Id., 91 L. Ed. 2d at 358.
103. Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)).
104. Id. at 2611-12, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 358-59.
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(3) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
106. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983).
107. 106 S. Ct. at 2611-12, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 358-59.
108. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
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under the fourteenth amendment, but the belief that the right to punish
should be restricted only by the statutes and a minimal requirement of due
process proportionally reduced the importance of assuring an accurate find-
ing of incompetency. 109 Both Justices agreed with the majority, however,
that the opportunity to be heard is the hallmark of justice and a minimum
due process requirement that must be protected. 110 Justice O'Connor and
Justice White, therefore, would have found execution of the insane in viola-
tion of the criminal's right to due process, but only because of section 922.07
of the Florida statute, which created that constitutional right. "' In accord-
ance with their conclusion, the two Justices would have remanded the case
to the state for reexamination of Ford's competency in light of the four-
teenth amendment." 12
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger: Historical Precedent. Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented from Justice Marshall's
majority opinion. The two Justices asserted that a more detailed reading of
history would result in quite a different conclusion. 1 3 Although they noted
that throughout history society rarely executed insane criminals, they
claimed that the executive branch possessed such discretion. 1'4 The dissent-
ers cited Solesbee v. Balkcom 11 as authority for the proposition that the
executive branch controls the destiny of the insane criminal. 16 The dissent-
ers also indicted the majority's opinion by pointing to the absurdity that
judicial review could create by postponing the finality of the law. 1 7 Justice
Rehnquist expanded on the majority's concern for finality by emphasizing
the inherent need for a society to be able to "try, convict, and execute
sentences."' 18
The dissenters actually were waging a procedural battle. They found it
unnecessary for the Court to rule on the constitutionality of executing the
insane since a uniform view exists throughout the states. 119 Based upon
what the dissenters claim as historical precedent, they would have upheld
Florida's process of allowing the Governor to preside over the sanity
hearings. 120
109. 106 S. Ct. at 2612, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 359.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 2613, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 359-60.
112. Id.
113. Id., 91 L. Ed. 2d at 360-61.
114. Id. (citing I N. WALKER, supra note 31, at 194).
115. 339 U.S. 9, 11-14 (1950).
116. The power to determine insanity has traditionally been vested in the executive branch,
headed by the Governor or the President; the courts have seldom reviewed this power. Id. at
11-12.
117. 106 S. Ct. at 2614, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 361-62; see Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06
(1897).
118. 106 S. Ct. at 2614, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 362. The majority had outlined possible ways to
dispose of repetitive and unmeritorious claims. Id. at 2606, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 361.
119. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.




The majority opinion ultimately concluded that, based on the objective
and subjective tests, the eighth amendment prohibits execution of the insane.
The majority also invalidated section 922.07 of the Florida statutes because
it failed to provide adequate assurances of due process in accordance with
Townsend v. Sain. The Court cited the lack of cross-examination, attorney
involvement, and the opportunity to be heard as fatal flaws in the Florida
law. The majority noted that the main deficiency in the statute was that the
sole decision rested in the executive branch and was not reviewable by the
courts. The three additional opinions focused upon a wide variety of topics
and concerns.
Since no state has executed an insane prisoner, the holding in Ford v.
Wainwright on the eighth amendment merely reaffirms the current law
among the states. The striking of the Florida statute as an unconstitutional
infringement of due process, however, will cause the states to reassess their
existing statutes. The Court provides little guidance for the states, although
it attempts to establish some general standards for the evidentiary process in
the determination of sanity. The matter of what constitutes a sufficient evi-
dentiary process in the eyes of the Constitution, therefore, remains to be
seen.
Kevin E. Cox
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